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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court decided recently in Graham v. Florida that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of life in prison without parole
for a nonhomicide crime committed by a minor. In its decision, the
Court stated that “[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the
1
Eighth Amendment” and that it is the “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] of2
fense.” What about proportionality makes it a matter of justice? And
how does proportionality cohere with our constitutional values? This
Article addresses these questions.

†

Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010).
2
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367
(1910)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1

(1835)
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I. WHY PROPORTIONALITY?
Why does proportionality matter for the Constitution? The principle of proportionality is commonly associated with the retributivist—
or just deserts—theory of punishment, or the idea that people should
3
receive the punishment that they deserve and no more. However,
simply saying that some people deserve to be punished does not explain why the State must be the one to mete out the punishment people deserve. As a general matter, the State is not in the business of
ensuring just deserts. Bad things may happen to good people, just as
some people may achieve far more success than they deserve. But it is
not the State’s job to intervene and take from those who have more
4
than they deserve and give to those who have less. We need to move
beyond the simple assertion that some people deserve certain things
when attempting to justify the State’s role in doling out punishment.
To make some headway into the question of why proportionality
matters, we must first explore the rationales for criminal law. I highlight two in particular here. First, criminal law plays an important role
in preserving physical security through its system of prohibitions and
5
punishments. That is, harm reduction is an important goal of criminal law. Second, criminal law functions to displace feelings of resent6
ment and desires for personal vengeance by punishing wrongdoing.
As John Gardner put it, “The blood feud, the vendetta, the duel, the
revenge, the lynching: for the elimination of these modes of retaliation, more than anything else, the criminal law as we know it today
7
came into existence.”
These two aspects of criminal law explain several key features of
our criminal justice system, namely that it is coercive, judgmental, and

3

See ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING:
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 1 (2005) (treating the terms “proportionate” and “deserved”
interchangeably in the punishment context); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31
(2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Proportionality—the notion that the
punishment should fit the crime—is inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of
retribution.”).
4
See David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 542 (1991)
(“After all, the government, state, or ‘society’ does not automatically take it upon itself
to give people what they deserve in other respects.”).
5
See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 3-6 (2001).
6
See, e.g., JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 213 (2007) (“The justifiability of criminal punishment, and
criminal law in general, is closely connected to the unjustifiability of our retaliating
against those who wrong us.”).
7
Id. at 213.
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preemptive. First, its coercive aspect reveals itself most dramatically and
obviously through the process of apprehending and punishing offenders. The coercive aspect is essential for ensuring order and physical
8
security—a key function of criminal law.
Second, the criminal justice system is judgmental in the sense that
when we punish, we also blame, condemn, and stigmatize the offend9
ers. By stigmatizing offenders, punishment gets “personal” and sends
10
the message that their acts reflect badly on them. This judgmental
aspect derives at least partially from the displacement function of criminal law. A core purpose of criminal law and punishment is to manage
the punitive and retaliatory emotions of those who have been victims of
wrongdoers (as well as others in the community who feel indirectly vic11
timized) and to sublimate, displace, and provide an outlet for feelings
of resentment toward the wrongdoers. The success or failure of a society’s criminal law system thus depends on how well it responds to the
12
punitive emotions of its citizens.
Finally, the criminal justice system is preemptive in that the State is the
13
exclusive agent licensed to punish criminal wrongdoing. Although the
basic idea of retribution—that people should receive what they deserve—appears facially neutral on the question of who should be the one

8

See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 3, at 21-27 (describing how “hard treatment” prevents future crimes and harms).
9
See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY
100 (1970) (noting the tendency of punishment to express both society’s “strong disapproval of what the criminal did” and a “kind of vindictive resentment” toward the criminal).
10
See VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 48 (2005) (“The imposition of
criminal responsibility, at least within the range of relatively serious offences, necessarily
involves moral criticism of the defendant as a person.”); John Gardner, On the General
Part of the Criminal Law (“The criminal law gets personal. To be convicted of a crime is
to be criticised, or even sometimes condemned, as a person.”), in PHILOSOPHY AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 205, 236 (Antony Duff ed., 1998).
11
See S.E. Marshall & R.A. Duff, Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs, 11 CANADIAN
J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 7, 20 (1998) (“A group can . . . ‘share’ the wrongs done to its
individual members . . . . Wrongs done to individual members of the community are
then wrongs against the whole community—injuries to a common or shared, not merely
to an individual, good.”).
12
See GARDNER, supra note 6, at 216 (“[T]he criminal law’s medicine must be strong
enough to control the toxins of bitterness and resentment which course through the
veins of those who are wronged, or else the urge to retaliate in kind will persist unchecked.”).
13
See Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Case Against
Privately Inflicted Sanctions, 14 LEGAL THEORY 113, 115 (2008) (“To the extent that the
state prohibits certain sorts of conduct, it is the state and the state alone that ought to
administer sanctions for the violations of these prohibitions.”).
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giving wrongdoers what they deserve, the government is the only legitimate punisher, and the law prohibits private individuals from taking the
14
law into their own hands. This preemptive aspect is essential to both
the harm prevention and the displacement functions of criminal law.
How does all this relate to our Constitution’s requirement of proportionality? We cannot understand the various substantive and procedural safeguards rooted in our criminal justice system without
reference to the overarching role that criminal law plays in our society.
The government enjoys an enormous amount of power, not only to
interfere forcefully with people’s lives and to brand individuals with
the stigma of blameworthiness, but also to prohibit others from doing
the same. In order for the government to maintain its status as the
exclusive legitimate wielder of this power, it must use its force in certain specified ways.
That is, the displacement function begets the judgmental aspect of
punishment, and as the State metes out this punishment and blame, it
must do so under the constraints of fairness. To achieve fairness, the
State must punish in a manner that is consistent with principles of
15
proportionality: it must treat its citizens equally. To be more precise,
proportionality principles ensure that the State treats the equals equally
and the unequals unequally.
The fundamental legal protection that people be punished no
more than they deserve is thus a requirement that flows neither from
the laws of morality nor from some general principle that people
ought to receive only what they deserve. Rather, it is one of many
conditions that attach to the government’s exclusive control of the
power to criminalize and punish, and only by respecting such constraints can the State maintain the legitimacy of its exclusive control.
These three central aspects of criminal law not only establish the
proportionality-based limitation as an important restriction on the
State’s power to punish, but they also suggest that that limitation should
take the form of a constitutional right that is resistant to tradeoffs. The
harm prevention and displacement functions of criminal law demon-

14

See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE
LAW ON TRIAL 18 (1988) (“A legal system is possible only if the state enjoys a monopoly of
force. When private individuals appeal to force and decide who shall enjoy the right to
‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’ there can be no pretense of the rule of law.”).
15
Cf. Joel Feinberg, Some Unswept Debris from the Hart-Devlin Debate, 72 SYNTHESE 249,
254-57 (1987) (“[I]t is surely unfair that a less blameworthy violation of a statute should
be morally condemned more severely than a more blameworthy one. Fairness requires
that relevantly dissimilar cases should be treated in appropriately dissimilar ways.”).
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strate how the power to punish can be abused. Punitive passions, while
frequently and correctly based on the belief that a moral wrong has occurred, can be excessive and driven by other less desirable sentiments
16
such as cruelty, sadism, inhumanity, and racial hatred or prejudice.
Such sentiments may drive punishments well beyond what offenders
deserve. In addition, the pressures the State faces to reduce crime
17
could lead it to use excessive and unwarranted violence.
Therefore, as the exclusive agent of punishment, the government
has dual commitments. On the one hand, because citizens are generally prohibited from defending themselves with violence or retaliating
18
against wrongdoers, the government has an obligation to provide
physical security to its citizens and respond adequately to any wrongdoing. On the other hand, the government cannot preserve its legitimacy as the sole rightful holder of the power to punish unless it
respects the restrictions on its use of force, including proportionality.
These two commitments can pull the government in different directions. The State can sometimes provide physical security more efficiently and effectively by ignoring various substantive and procedural
safeguards placed on its power. But if the State starts to abuse its power
in this way, its status as the legitimate holder of the power to criminalize
19
and punish will be threatened. Yet there will be times when respecting
these safeguards may seem downright irresponsible—a dereliction of
duty—because the safeguards may get in the way of convicting and
20
punishing wrongdoers. This reality means that unless we treat the
constraints against disproportionate punishment as near inviolable,
proportionality-based restrictions on punishment will yield too often
and will not meaningfully limit the government’s power to punish.

16

Cf. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 45-49 (Keith AnsellPearson ed., Carol Diethe trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1887) (examining
moral prejudices and their sources).
17
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25253 (2011) (discussing the “political backlash” that led to increased incarceration rates
in the mid-to-late twentieth century).
18
See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57
U. PITT. L. REV. 553, 556-58 (1996).
19
See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 17, at 285-86 (discussing “the crisis of legitimacy that
the criminal justice system faces” due to the disproportionate number of black men
imprisoned in America).
20
For a provocative articulation of this perspective, see Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs,
58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 750 (2005).
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II. PROPORTIONALITY IN THE SUPREME COURT
How well are the justifications for proportionality presented in Part
I reflected in our constitutional jurisprudence? In order to answer this
question, we first have to be clear on various analytic devices the Supreme Court employs in its proportionality analysis. The Court uses at
least four different tests.
First, sometimes the nature of the Court’s proportionality analysis
is essentially comparative. The questions are not whether, say, robbery
21
is a serious crime, but whether it is as serious as other crimes, and not
whether a mentally retarded killer is culpable, but whether he is as
22
culpable as an adult of normal intelligence who kills on purpose. I
will refer to the analysis the Court applies here as “relative culpability.”
Second, the Court has also understood proportionality in
noncomparative terms. As the Graham Court explained, proportionality
calls for courts to compare “the gravity of the offense and the severity
23
of the sentence.” This kind of proportionality analysis, which I will
call the “absolute culpability” test, is about matching. It requires the
court to take a particular crime and a particular punishment and set
them against each other, without regard to how other crimes are punished. The absolute and relative culpability tests are closely related,
and I will refer to them collectively as the “culpability test.”
The third kind of proportionality analysis, which I will call the
“pointless suffering” test, asks whether the punishment advances one
of the goals of punishment or whether it is “nothing more than the
24
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.” According to the Graham Court, “[a] sentence lacking any legitimate penolog25
ical justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.”
Under this test, if the punishment does not advance a legitimate purpose, then it is not proportionate.

21

See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-98, 801 (1982) (finding an individual’s
blameworthiness for committing robbery less than that of committing more heinous
crimes, such as murder, and so concluding that the death penalty is inappropriate for
convicted robbers).
22
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317-21 (2002) (holding that mentally retarded
individuals are less culpable for their actions as compared to adults of normal intelligence and thus cannot be sentenced to death).
23
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010).
24
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
25
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
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Fourth and finally, there is the proportionality analysis advanced
26
by the Court in Ewing v. California. Under this test, which I will call
the “disjunctive test,” the Court asks whether the punishment advances
27
one of the traditional goals of punishment. The Ewing Court wrote,
“A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation,
28
And according to the
deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.”
Court, for a punishment to pass constitutional muster, “it is enough
that the [State] has a reasonable basis for believing” that its punishment “advance[s] the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any sub29
stantial way.”
The third and fourth proportionality analyses are closely related,
but different. The “pointless suffering” test reflects the idea that punishment should not be imposed unless it advances some objective. That
is, it states a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a punishment
to survive a constitutional challenge. The disjunctive test from Ewing,
by contrast, states a sufficient condition for constitutionality: as long
as a punishment advances some objective, it is constitutional.
A. The Relative Culpability Test
As a theoretical matter, the relative culpability test is important for
proportionality because what one wrongdoer deserves is sometimes
determined by reference to what other wrongdoers deserve. When the
State punishes, the relation of one person’s punishment for a crime to
punishments for other crimes supplies a reference point against which
to judge how wrong society believes the behavior to be. A punishment
would be “undeserved” if it is more severe than the punishment imposed on those who have committed more—or equally—serious
crimes because the judgment the punishment expresses about the se30
riousness of the criminal’s behavior would be inappropriate.
26

538 U.S. 11 (2003).
See id. at 25.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 28 (alterations in original) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 n.22
(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30
See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 9, at 118 (arguing that “the degree of disapproval
expressed by the punishment should ‘fit’ the crime . . . in the . . . sense that the more
serious crimes should receive stronger disapproval than the less serious ones”); ANDREW
VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 15-16 (1993) (“By punishing one kind of conduct
more severely than another, the punisher conveys the message that it is worse—which is
appropriate only if the conduct is indeed worse (i.e. more serious). Were penalties ordered in severity inconsistently with the comparative seriousness of crime, the less reprehensible conduct would, undeservedly, receive the greater reprobation.”).
27
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For example, the death penalty carries a social meaning as the ultimate punishment reserved for only the most serious crimes. Thus,
each time the State imposes a death sentence, it sends the message that
it considers the crime to be not only among the most serious offenses,
but also equally serious to other crimes that society has labeled—and
punished—as the most serious. Those who commit less serious offenses and are still sentenced to death would be receiving harsher sentences than they deserve, because to receive the punishment they
31
deserve they must be punished less harshly than the worst criminal.
The Court thus rightly places much importance on the relative
culpability test in its proportionality jurisprudence. The Court has
created a number of categorical exemptions from death sentences for
certain crimes and groups of criminals. A criminal cannot constitu32
tionally be sentenced to death for the crime of rape, even if the vic33
tim is a child. It is also unconstitutional to punish by death someone
who does not kill or intend to kill, but who is convicted under a felony34
murder statute for aiding and abetting a murder, unless the person
35
showed “reckless indifference to human life.” A person cannot be
36
sentenced to death if he is mentally retarded, or for a crime committed
37
before the age of eighteen. Nor can a person be sentenced to life in
prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime committed before the
38
age of eighteen.

31

Relative culpability is not the same as equality. Equality has generally come to
mean equal treatment for similarly situated individuals. Relative culpability, by contrast, requires this and more: “like cases [should] be treated alike . . . [and] unlike
cases [should] be treated in an appropriately unlike way.” Thomas Hurka, Desert: Individualistic and Holistic, in DESERT AND JUSTICE 45, 54 (Serena Olsaretti ed., 2003). Differential treatment is thus fundamental to relative culpability.
32
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
33
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008).
34
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
35
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). Tison held that the death penalty was
appropriate in a felony-murder case in which the defendant did not kill, but was a substantial participant in the felony and demonstrated reckless disregard for human life.
Tison is a controversial case and is in tension with the principle of proportionality and
the Court’s recent proportionality jurisprudence. See generally Joseph Trigilio & Tracy
Casadio, Executing Those Who Do Not Kill: A Categorical Approach to Proportional Sentencing,
48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1371 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s movement toward proportionality in the cases of Atkins v. Georgia, Roper v. Simmons, and Kennedy v. Louisiana gives
cause to revisit the holding in Tison).
36
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
37
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
38
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
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The logic driving these cases—and the relative culpability test in
general—can be summed up in one sentence: X is bad, but not as bad
39
as Y. For instance, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, which held that a sentence
of death is a grossly disproportionate punishment for the rape of a
child, the Court reasoned that “there is a distinction between intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes
40
against individual persons, even including child rape, on the other.”
While acknowledging that the “latter crimes may be devastating in
their harm,” the Court concluded that “‘in terms of moral depravity
and of the injury to the person and to the public,’ they cannot be
41
compared to murder in their ‘severity and irrevocability.’” In Graham, too, the Court explained that “when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice
42
diminished moral culpability.” That is, “defendants who do not kill,
intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less de43
serving of the most serious forms of punishment than are murderers.”
Moreover, the Court noted that “juveniles have lessened culpability”
44
and are “less deserving of the most severe punishments.”
B. The Absolute Culpability Test
The importance of the absolute culpability factor for proportionality
is obvious: that it would be disproportionate to punish a parking violation with a year in prison would be true even if every parking violation
were treated equally and more serious crimes were treated more
45
harshly.
However, it is unclear how the absolute culpability test,
which calls for matching “the gravity of the offense and the severity of
46
the sentence,” is to be applied. A ten dollar fine for murder is obvi-

39

For a more detailed discussion of such a comparison of culpability, see Youngjae
Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 721-25 (2005).
40
554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008).
41
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
42
130 S. Ct. at 2027.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 2026.
45
See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 297, 311 (1974) (“If
beheading and disembowelment became the standard punishment for overtime parking, . . . the penalty as applied in a given case would be unjust . . . even though it were
applied uniformly and without discrimination to all offenders. Moreover, it would be
unjust even if it were the mildest penalty in the whole system of criminal law, with more
serious offenses punished with proportionately greater severity still . . . .”).
46
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
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ously too lenient, and five years in jail for jaywalking is clearly too
harsh. Beyond such extreme cases, however, absolute culpability judgments seem contestable. The problem is that crime and punishment
are incommensurable. That is, the two scales, one crime and the other
punishment, seem to have little to do with one another. The crime
scale cannot be translated into the punishment scale, nor vice versa, in
the way a scale of inches can be translated into a scale of centimeters.
As a result of this incommensurability, crime and punishment are incomparable, which creates a problem for the notion of equivalence
47
between the two. These concerns led H.L.A. Hart to call the idea of
48
proportionality “the most perplexing feature” of retributivism, while
49
Oliver Wendell Holmes described it as “mystic.”
While, perhaps for these reasons, the absolute culpability test has
not played a prominent role in the Supreme Court’s proportionality
jurisprudence, the Court has at times relied on the idea. For example,
despite the sharpness of disagreement among some Justices in this area,
it appears that one proposition has commanded broad, if not unanimous, support: life imprisonment for parking violations would be an
50
excessive punishment and thus unconstitutional. But the Court has
also recently made statements that come close to making a commitment to other, less obvious propositions about absolute culpability.
For instance, in Kennedy, the Court acknowledged its “hesitation” to
allow the death penalty in situations “where no life was taken in the
51
commission of the crime.” The Court indicated in Kennedy that there
would be an incongruity between crime and punishment if the State
took a life for a crime that did not itself take a life, suggesting an “eye

47

For a useful discussion of the distinction between “incommensurability” and “incomparability,” see Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY,
AND PRACTICAL REASON 1, 1-2 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
48
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 233 (1968).
49
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 37 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Belknap Press 1963) (1881).
50
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1018 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (“[I]t
[would not] be unreasonable to conclude that it would be both cruel and unusual to
punish overtime parking by life imprisonment.”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (asserting that levying a life sentence for a parking violation would “offend our felt sense of justice”); cf. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986 n.11 (opinion
of Scalia, J.) (noting that life imprisonment for a parking violation would be “horrible,”
but that such a punishment would be unlikely to ever occur); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274
n.11 (acknowledging that proportionality comes into play with such an “extreme example” as life imprisonment for overtime parking).
51
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 435 (2008).
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52

for an eye” type correspondence. In Graham, the Court stressed that
“[l]ife without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juve53
nile,” as it “deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without
54
giving hope of restoration,” and also fails to account for the fact that
“a juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater
55
percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.” Again, the
Court here appears to emphasize that the punishment of life without
parole does not properly “match” offenses committed by juvenile offenders.
C. The Pointless Suffering Test
The pointless suffering test asks whether the punishment in question advances a traditional penological goal or is “nothing more than
56
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.” As a
matter of proportionality, the pointless suffering test is redundant. To
demonstrate that a punishment results in pointless suffering, one must
first show that the punishment is disproportionate from the just deserts perspective. But once that finding has been reached, there is no
reason to ask whether other purposes of punishment are being advanced. The punishment is problematic even without any such demonstration.
The pointless suffering test is not necessary as a doctrinal matter
either, as illustrated by Coker v. Georgia. In Coker, the Court held that
imposing the death penalty for rape is unconstitutional, and, after
mentioning the culpability test and the pointless suffering test, stated
57
that a “punishment might fail the test on either ground.” The Court
explained in a footnote, “Because the death sentence is a dispropor-

52

The Biblical maxim of lex talionis (commonly known as “an eye for an eye”)
reads, “If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth,
hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.” Exodus
21:23-25 (New Revised Standard); see also MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION: EVIL FOR
EVIL IN ETHICS, LAW, AND LITERATURE 68-74 (1990) (discussing various versions of lex
talionis in the Bible). Even though the maxim sounds cruel to the modern reader, lex
talionis was a limiting principle in its historical context. As Igor Primoratz has explained, the principle served to “restrain[] the vengefulness of the wronged” by commanding “for one life, take one, not ten lives; for one eye, take one, not both.” IGOR
PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 87 (1989).
53
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010).
54
Id. at 2027.
55
Id. at 2028.
56
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
57
Id. (emphasis added).
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tionate punishment for rape, it is cruel and unusual punishment within
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment even though it may measurably
serve the legitimate ends of punishment and therefore is not invalid for its fail58
ure to do so.” The Court, in reaching this conclusion, relied exclusively
on the culpability test and paid no heed to the pointless suffering
59
test. Interestingly, in its Kennedy decision, the Court repeated the
60
language that a “punishment might fail the test on either ground,”
after it had been absent from majority opinions for three decades, although the Court did not rely on or explain the statement.
Moreover, when one applies the Coker Court’s formulation that a
punishment may be unconstitutional under either the culpability test
or the pointless suffering test, it becomes evident that the latter test is
not only unnecessary but also redundant. The Court considers retribution to be a legitimate goal of punishment, and its assessment of the
culpability of the relevant class of offenders has not differed in any way
from its assessment of whether the punishment can be justified on re61
tributivist grounds. Thus, if a punishment fails the pointless suffering
test, then it must a fortiori fail the culpability test. In other words, a
punishment may be unconstitutional either for failing the culpability
test or the pointless suffering test, but a showing of the latter necessarily
includes a showing of the former. Therefore, a punishment’s failure
to pass the culpability test is both necessary and sufficient for it to be
unconstitutionally disproportionate, and the pointless suffering test is
mere surplusage.
Although the Court has not acknowledged the pointlessness of the
pointless suffering test, it has, as a matter of practice, made it redundant. Whenever the Court determines that a punishment is unconstitutional for failing the relative culpability test (that is, X is bad, but not
as bad as Y ), it also tends to conclude that the punishment in question
fails the pointless suffering test. For example, the Roper Court, in declaring the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional, concluded that
“neither retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justification for

58

Id. at 592 n.4 (emphasis added).
The extent to which the Court paid attention to the deterrence question appears
to be confined to the following single sentence in a footnote, implying an extremely
demanding version of the purposes of punishment test: “We observe that . . . it would
be difficult to support a claim that the death penalty for rape is an indispensable part
of the States’ criminal justice system.” Id.
60
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
61
See Lee, supra note 39, at 690.
59
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imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders.” The Atkins Court,
holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional when imposed on
mentally retarded offenders, stated that it was “not persuaded that the
execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the
63
deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty.” The Kennedy Court, too, found that the death penalty for child rape “would not
64
further retributive purposes” and “may not result in more deterrence
65
or more effective enforcement.”
Of course, there is nothing wrong with the idea that punishments
that serve no purpose should not be allowed. Instead, the problem
with the pointless suffering test is that it is unclear what it adds to the
analysis, yet it gives the impression that for a punishment to be unconstitutional, it must not advance any of the traditional goals of punishment. This impression is misleading, because, under Coker, a punishment may be found unconstitutional for failing either the culpability
test or the pointless suffering test. Further, the impression that a punishment must not advance any penological purpose to be excessive
creates confusion between the pointless suffering test and the disjunctive test.
D. The Disjunctive Test
Under the disjunctive test, as long as a punishment advances one of
the objectives of punishment, it is constitutionally permitted. As discussed above, providing physical security may sometimes be done
more efficiently and effectively if the State can at times ignore proportionality limitations. Because of this strong temptation to punish excessively, it is important to implement proportionality limitations as
rights. The right against excessive punishment should therefore have
the following form: even if doing X to A would advance an overall
purpose of punishment, it should not be done because doing X to A
would be disproportionate. This structure is nonsensical from the
perspective of the disjunctive theory because that theory terminates
the analysis if a legitimate end of punishment is served. In our crimi66
nal justice system, we pursue various goals, but the pursuit takes place

62
63
64
65
66

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 442 (2008).
Id. at 445.
See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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67

under a set of fairness constraints. The disjunctive theory allows the
delicate relationship between goals and constraints to be disturbed by
dissolving the constraints and permitting the goals to dominate unchecked. This is a reason to reject the disjunctive theory.
As a doctrinal matter, the disjunctive theory is a relatively recent
invention. The origin of the disjunctive theory can be found in Justice
68
Harmelin
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan.
held that a sentence of a mandatory term of life in prison without the
possibility of parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine was not
69
cruel and unusual. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy stated that
one of the principles governing the Court’s inquiry into proportionality
is that “the Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one
penological theory,” as “[t]he federal and state criminal systems have
accorded different weights at different times to the penological goals
70
of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.” This
statement is uncontroversially true.
However, there is a difference between the principle that the Constitution does not mandate the legislature to adopt any one penological
theory in determining how to set appropriate sentences, and the principle
that the Constitution does not mandate the judiciary to adopt any one
penological theory in determining how to set limits on sentences devised by
legislatures. The two ideas should not be equated, but that is precisely
what the Court did in Ewing v. California, in which it held that a prison
term of twenty-five years to life under California’s three-strikes law was
not excessive for the crime of stealing three golf clubs by a repeat of71
fender.
After citing Harmelin for the proposition that retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are all legitimate purposes of
punishment, the plurality in Ewing stated that “[s]ome or all of these
justifications may play a role in a State’s sentencing scheme” and that
“[s]electing the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be
72
made by state legislatures, not federal courts.” The plurality then

67

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
69
Id. at 961, 994-96 (opinion of Scalia, J.). No opinion in Harmelin gained a majority, and the opinion that eventually came to assume the status of law is Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter.
70
Id. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
71
538 U.S. 11, 17-18, 30-31 (2003) (plurality opinion).
72
Id. at 25.
68
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noted that “[r]ecidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis
for increased punishment” and that California has an interest in inca73
pacitating repeat offenders and deterring crimes. The plurality concluded by articulating the disjunctive theory: “It is enough that the
State . . . has a reasonable basis for believing that [the punishment] . . . ‘advance[s] the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any
74
substantial way.’”
So, it appears that to the extent the Supreme Court subscribes to
the disjunctive test, it is committed to an incorrect theory of proportionality. Fortunately, there have been signs recently that the Court
realizes that it took a wrong step in Ewing. For example, as mentioned
above, the Court noted in Kennedy that “[a] punishment might fail the
test on either” the culpability test or the pointless suffering test, which
75
directly contradicts the disjunctive test.
More significantly, the Court went a step further while discussing
the deterrence rationale in Graham. After making the usual comment
about the immaturity of juveniles, the Court added that “[e]ven if the
punishment has some connection to a valid penological goal, it must
be shown that the punishment is not grossly disproportionate in light
76
of the justification offered.” The Court concluded that “in light of
juvenile nonhomicide offenders’ diminished moral responsibility, any
limited deterrent effect provided by life without parole is not enough
to justify the sentence,” even though it is “perhaps plausible” that “the
77
sentence deters in a few cases.” Similarly, in discussing the incapacitation rationale, the Court noted that “[i]ncapacitation cannot override
all other considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment’s rule against dis78
proportionate sentences be a nullity.”
These statements suggest that potential incapacitation or deterrence effects will not be reason enough to uphold certain punishments, which may mean that the era of the disjunctive theory is over.
Along these lines, it is important to note that the Court made these
statements after it declined to apply the Ewing framework. Ewing was
the first case to clearly articulate the disjunctive test and also arguably

73

Id.
Id. at 28 (fourth and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 297 n.22 (1983)).
75
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
76
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010).
77
Id.
78
Id.
74
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the case most on point for Graham because it too involved noncapital
excessiveness.
Before Graham, the Supreme Court’s proportionality jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment proceeded along two tracks—
capital and noncapital—where the Court applied different tests, lead79
ing to different outcomes, depending on the track. Graham’s ruling
80
changed this framework. The Graham Court, considering a challenge
to a prison sentence, announced that “the appropriate analysis” was
not the one used in Harmelin and Ewing, both of which dealt with prison
sentences, but the one used in Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy, all death
81
penalty cases. After Graham, it seems that Ewing will no longer retain
its status as the most important noncapital excessiveness case. Ewing
and its disjunctive test may go the way of Rummel v. Estelle, in which the
Court unsuccessfully attempted in 1980 to foreclose, once and for all,
defendants’ ability to challenge noncapital sentences on excessiveness

79

See Lee, supra note 39, at 687-99 (tracking the development of case law for capital
and noncapital cases and concluding that the “death is different” rationale does not
account for the different approaches between the two types of cases); see also Rachel E.
Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and
the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1175-86 (2009) (analyzing alternate theories to account for the difference between capital and noncapital cases, including
administrative concerns).
80
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 49, 49-50
(2010) (stating that the Court in Graham for the first time applied its categorical proportionality analysis for capital offenses to a noncapital crime); Richard S. Frase, Graham’s Good News—and Not, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 54, 54 (2010) (arguing that Graham
“suggests a more unified approach to proportionality,” in contrast with the Court’s
prior “two-track distinction between death and prison sentences”); Youngjae Lee, The
Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 58, 58 (2010) (explaining how Graham
represents a departure from the Court’s prior two-track test); Eva S. Nilsen, From Harmelin to Graham—Justice Kennedy Stakes Out a Path to Proportional Punishment, 23 FED.
SENT’G REP. 67, 68 (2010) (suggesting that the Court finally saw similarities between
death and life without parole, showing that “[d]eath [i]s [n]ot [t]otally [d]ifferent”);
Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “Death Is Different No Longer”: Graham v. Florida and the
Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 327, 328-30
(stating that Graham signaled the end of the capital versus noncapital distinction); Carol
S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine In: The Supreme Court Opens a
Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to Eighth Amendment Proportionality
Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79, 81 (2010) (“Justice Kennedy thus managed to transform what had looked like a capital versus noncapital line, the application of which rendered noncapital challenges essentially hopeless, into a categorical rule versus individual
sentence line, in which individuals asserting proportionality challenges based on special
group circumstances (such as reduced moral culpability) could avoid the threshold
chopping block that had previously doomed noncapital proportionality challenges.”).
81
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
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grounds. In short, it seems that the Supreme Court in Graham has
come closer than ever to the theory of proportionality outlined in Part
I of this Article.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that there is a good reason, grounded in a
broad political theory concerning the role of criminal law and the State,
to consider that the “concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth
83
Amendment” and that it is the “precept of justice that punishment for
84
crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” This
Article has further contended that this theoretical perspective is reflected—albeit unevenly and imperfectly—in the Supreme Court’s proportionality jurisprudence.
Of course, many questions remain. Proportionality, even if understood correctly, remains a vague idea. Not only is it vague, but the
questions of who deserves what and which crimes are more deserving
85
and which less deserving of punishment are highly contestable issues.
The vagueness and contestability of proportionality strengthen the
separation-of-powers norms that determinations of specific prison
terms for crimes traditionally have been and should be “properly within the province of legislatures, not courts” and that courts should gen86
erally defer to legislatures in this realm. In the end, the limited role
of the judiciary should be kept in mind when shaping the doctrine and
adjusting the level of deference given to legislatures at the implemen87
tation stage.
82

See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1980) (explaining that the Court was
reluctant to review terms of imprisonment that were legislatively mandated because of
separation of powers concerns). While Rummel continues to be cited as good law, its
holding is impossible to reconcile with the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence. See Lee,
supra note 39, at 730 n.246.
83
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.
84
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367
(1910)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85
See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, Keeping Desert Honest (arguing that incapacitation and deterrence “need to be constrained” by principles of desert), in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 49, 51 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009); Alice Ristroph, The New Desert
(stating that desert is an “elastic” concept that can change as reforms in the criminal
justice system are made), in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra, 45, 49.
86
See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275-76.
87
I have made some suggestions along these lines elsewhere. See generally Youngjae
Lee, Judicial Regulation of Excessive Punishments Through the Eighth Amendment, 18 FED.
SENT’G REP. 234, 234 (2006) (discussing how the Court can protect Eighth Amendment
rights while maintaining deference to the legislature).
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The starting point in this endeavor, however, should be to end the
Atkins-Roper-Kennedy impression that enforcing the Eighth Amendment
is appropriate only when it is costless to law enforcement. Being serious
about enforcing the Eighth Amendment requires giving up some of the
deterrence and incapacitation benefits of punishment in certain instances. That rights must be enforced despite their accompanying costs
is a familiar notion in constitutional law. As Justice Alito reminded us
recently, “[a]ll of the constitutional provisions that impose restrictions
on law enforcement and on the prosecution of crimes” have “controver88
sial public safety implications.” In other words, the Eighth Amendment right against excessive punishment should be treated like any
other right, and there is a good political philosophical reason for doing
so.

88

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3045 (2010).

